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I. Introduction
In the last several terms, the Supreme Court has handed
down no fewer than forty full opinions concerning the law of
search and seizure, and has, accordingly, radically changed the
face - some would say the body - of the fourth amendment.
Given such judicial activity and activism, some inspection of
these recent decisions and, especially, their effect on the rules of
evidence is essential to their proper application in the court-
room. This is best done, not by viewing these decisions as self-
contained or spontaneously conceived propositions, but by trac-
ing the development of the fourth amendment and placing these
recent interpretations in their proper historical and legal
context.
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trict of North Carolina, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. B.A., Bucknell University,
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Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
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The approach to search and seizure issues which I believe
most suggests itself - and is adopted in this paper - is one
comprising three levels of analysis. Specifically, in assessing the
admissibility of a particular piece of evidence, it must first be
determined whether the fourth amendment's protections have
been triggered, then whether they have been violated, and fi-
nally what remedy, if any, is to follow. Within this framework, I
hope to show that otherwise unintelligible opinions may be un-
derstood, formerly unpredictable decisions foreseen, and rhetori-
cal surplusage calmly abided. Out of the morass that is the
fourth amendment may very well come light.
II. A Tripartite Analysis of Searches and Seizures
A. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
1. Historical Development
The above words were included in the Bill of
Rights - largely due to the tireless efforts of James
Madison - primarily as a response to the use by the British of
general warrants or writs of assistance. Such writs, ostensibly is-
sued to enforce unpopular importation laws, often served as
blank checks authorizing the holder to arbitrarily search through
people's houses and belongings, seizing any evidence he would
find. Balanced against this reaction to those abuses, however,
was the realization by the Framers that the compelling interests
of the enforcement of justice sometimes necessitated acting
without a warrant.' As a direct result, the history and the pre-
cise phrasing of the amendment reflect both of these often-con-
flicting interests and, therefore, embody two indepen-
dent - though usually related - concepts: 1) persons, houses,
1. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITuTION (1937).
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papers, and effects shall not be unreasonably searched or seized;
and 2) if a warrant is issued, then it must be based on probable
cause, supported by oath, and limited by particularity of
description.
For the first 150 years or so, the fourth amendment received
relatively little judicial attention or development; it was gener-
ally thought that the laws of the fourth amendment were coex-
tensive with those of trespass and private property.2 Indeed, it
was not until Katz v. United Statess that the law of search and
seizure really began to mushroom into such monstrous propor-
tions as stand before us today. For it was in that case that the
Supreme Court uttered those seven famous words: "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.' Nor could the fourth
amendment be translated merely as some constitutional right to
privacy, held the Court, because the fourth amendment's "pro-
tections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at
all."'
The concomitant explosion of interest in the fourth amend-
ment was not, however, without its casualties. The most promi-
nent of these was a fundamental misunderstanding or misappro-
priation of the main thrust of the amendment's coverage, i.e.,
that unreasonable searches and seizures by the government are
prohibited, and that warrants, when issued, must be legally suf-
ficient and particular. This led to a conflation of these concep-
tually separate issues into one jumbled mess, culminating in the
pronouncement in Coolidge v. New Hampshire6 that all war-
rantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions."7
Instead of a reasonableness clause and a warrant clause,
each with its own set of criteria, the fourth amendment now em-
2. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (warrantless tapping of
telephone wires was not a violation of fourth amendment because all actions took place
off premises of defendant).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth amendment protects people not places. Thus, attach-
ment of electronic listening device to public telephone booth constituted a search under
the fourth amendment.).
4. Id. at 351.
5. Id. at 350.
6. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
7. Id. at 454-55 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (1967)).
19861
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braced for judicial purposes a single proposition: warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable. Thus, although the language of
the fourth amendment appears to indicate that those searches
and seizures conducted without a warrant be tested by one crite-
rion (reasonableness), while those conducted pursuant to a war-
rant by two criteria (reasonableness and sufficiency of the war-
rant), the Court nonetheless allowed the reasonableness clause
to be swallowed by the warrant clause. By so emphasizing the
requirement of a warrant over the reasonableness of the search
and seizure, the Court had, according to one critic, suddenly
"stood the fourth amendment on its head" from a historical
standpoint.' That the tail had finally begun to wag the dog was
recognized and lamented by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Coolidge. The law of search and seizure had become
"quite intolerable."'
2. Reshaping the Law after Katz
It soon became apparent to many that it was time for the
law of search and seizure to be returned to the language of the
fourth amendment. The first meaningful return was made in
Rakas v. Illinois,10 where the Court held that fourth amendment
coverage depends on whether the person claiming the coverage
"has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place."11
Quoting Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence, the Court de-
fined as "legitimate" an expectation "that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable,' """ and found that the passengers of an
8. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS, 23-24 (1969).
9. 403 U.S. at 490 (Harlan, J., concurring): "[It is apparent that the law of search
and seizure is due for an overhauling. State and federal law enforcement officers and
prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the present state of uncertainty
.Id
10. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
11. Id. at 143. This is not to be confused with the concept of standing as outlined in
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), where the Court held that the accused, who
was present in a house at the same time as a friend, had no standing to contest the
search of his friend's purse in which evidence was found. Thus, not only must a "search"
or "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment have occurred, but the person
who is raising the issue must have had a personal interest in the searched (or seized)
item adequate to raise the issue.
12. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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automobile in which an incriminating rifle and shells were found
did not have such a legitimate expectation in someone else's ve-
hicle. Moreover, a subjective expectation of not being discov-
ered - such as by a burglar plying his trade in an empty cabin
in a secluded wood - is simply not sufficient to trigger the
fourth amendment. Conspicuously absent from the Court's anal-
ysis is mention of the per se unreasonableness of warrantless
searches.
This approach was again used the following year in Smith v.
Maryland," as the Court upheld the warrantless installation
and use of a pen register to record numbers dialed from a sus-
pect's home phone. In determining that the use of the pen regis-
ter did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment, the
Court refined the Katz approach to comprise two discrete ques-
tions: Whether the individual has "exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy," and whether that expectation is
one "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "114 Again,
no denigration of warrantless searches.
Four years later, in United States v. Knotts,15 police officers
installed a beeper in a container of chloroform which was later
sold to the defendant; police then monitored the beeper to trace
the container to the defendant's cabin, where they discovered a
clandestine drug laboratory. The battle had begun in earnest.
The Court in Knotts held that the defendant had the traditional
expectation of privacy inside the cabin, but that the fourth
amendment recognizes no such expectation as to any actions
outside the cabin in the open fields. Since the beeper was used
only to reveal information that was otherwise "visible to the na-
ked eye from outside the cabin,"' there was simply no search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Nor did it matter
whether the government had trespassed on Knott's property, ob-
served the Court, because according to Katz the laws of property
and of search and seizure have gone their several ways.17
While the opinion on its face appeared to follow Katz, a
13. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
14. Id. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
15. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16. Id. at 285.
17. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
1986]
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closer inspection reveals what actually transpired. In Katz, the
Court held that even though there was no trespass, there was a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In Knotts,
however, the Court held that even though there was a trespass,
there was no search - at least with respect to the area outside
the cabin - within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
While the sanctity of the home was still held to be inviolate, the
area outside the home was increasingly becoming subject to a
balancing process, one which more and more was tilting in favor
of the state.
3. Narrowing the Fourth Amendment's Reach: Open
Fields
This tilt became even more evident the following term in
Oliver v. United States.18 There, faced with the warrantless
search by police officers of marijuana fields that were sur-
rounded by fencing and "No Trespassing" signs, the Court wres-
tled with the question of where to apply this "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" test. It was clear the home was entitled to
automatic fourth amendment coverage. Hence, no test need be
applied there. It was equally clear, as Justice Holmes had
pointed out in Hester v. United States,19 that only the curtilage
(which he defined as the area associated with the "sanctity of a
man's home"),20 and not any neighboring open fields, is entitled
to fourth amendment protection. Therefore, no test need be ap-
plied there either. What was altogether far from clear, however,
was where the "curtilage" ended and "open fields" began. In an-
swering that question, the Oliver Court looked to the intent of
the Framers.
Noting that James Madison's original draft of the fourth
amendment protected people in "their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property," but that the Framers
changed "other property" to the less inclusive "effects," the
Court concluded that the protections of the fourth amendment
"cannot be said to encompass open fields."'2 ' No doubt, the
18. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
19. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (fourth amendment protection is not afforded to open fields).
20. Id. at 59.
21. 466 U.S. at 176-77.
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Court observed, the Framers understood the term "effects" to
include personal, rather than real, property." As such, no
one - least of all the Framers - intended that the fourth
amendment should shelter criminal activity simply because
those with criminal intent choose to erect barriers, build fences,
or post "No Trespassing" signs. On the contrary, held the Court,
while the amendment reflects an overriding respect for the
sancitity of the home and its immediate surrounding area, it also
recognizes limits to its own coverage. The Court had no diffi-
culty, therefore, in admitting the fruits of the warrantless
search, holding that society simply was not prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable any subjective expectation of privacy Oliver
might have had in marijuana fields over one mile from his house.
Under the open fields doctrine, Oliver's marijuana fields had
no fourth amendment coverage, and Oliver had no fourth
amendment claim. The Court left open, however, the question of
which factors are to be used in determining where such coverage
ends, stressing only that the curtilage is to be distinguished from
open fields.2' The former was vaguely defined as the area imme-
diately adjacent to the home that an individual reasonably may
expect to remain private.24
This clear delineation between the home (and its curtilage)
and all else - ringing truer to the orginal intent of the Found-
ing Fathers than Oliver's dissenters suggested - was never
more in evidence than in United States v. Karo. 5 There, agents
from the Drug Enforcement Administration placed an electronic
tracking device inside a can of ether which was then delivered to
the defendant and subsequently monitored for over four
months. The Court left no doubt as to its present understanding
of the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment: a war-
rantless monitoring of a beeper does not violate the fourth
amendment when it reveals no information that could not have
been obtained through visual surveillance. 26 Nor does the mere
transfer to a suspect of an item containing a beeper infringe any
22. Id. at 177 n.7.
23. Id. at 180.
24. Id.
25. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
26. That the monitoring of the beeper allows for substantially better tracking than
does visual surveillance is irrelevant. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
19861
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privacy or possessory interest. But, once that beeper enters a
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, and
is monitored therein, all sorts of interests are infringed and
sanctions triggered. Such warrantless monitoring, which in real-
ity is nothing other than the search of a house without a war-
rant, "violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have
a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. ' '2 7
The Court's well-crafted analysis in Karo, through a sensi-
ble application of the second (objective) part of Katz's two-
pronged test, appeared to yield two equally sensible proposi-
tions: areas within the home, because society posits in them a
reasonable expectation of privacy, are presumed covered by the
fourth amendment; while areas outside the home, because soci-
ety posits in them a correspondingly lesser expectation of pri-
vacy, are presumed not so covered. Although both presumptions
are rebuttable - with the latter being more easily so - they
offered law-enforcement officers and magistrates an identifiable
and consistent starting point in determining whether and how to
conduct and evaluate searches and seizures.
However appealing such a bright-line distinction may have
been, it also served to highlight the question-begging nature of
Oliver's cloudy, if not flawed, analysis. In Oliver, the Court held
that, because society recognizes no privacy interest in such out-
door activities as the cultivation of crops, Oliver's marijuana
fields did not constitute curtilage, but were in fact open fields.' s
27. 468 U.S. at 714. The evidence obtained from the monitoring of the beeper inside
the house was used to get a warrant, which in turn resulted in the seizure of evidence
used against five defendants. Of these five, one - Karo himself - had no privacy in-
terest in the house in which the beeper was monitored and, therefore, no standing to
contest the admissibility of the items seized. Two others had no interest in any of the
places in which the beeper was monitored prior to its arrival at the house in Taos and,
because untainted evidence from the previous monitorings was presented in the warrant
affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid as to
them and the fruits thereof admissible. And the last two, while having privacy interests
in the prior monitorings and in the monitoring of the beeper when in the Taos residence,
did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the monitoring of the beeper when
the container was in the truck between locations. Therefore, because untainted evidence
from the monitoring of the beeper when in the truck, sufficient to establish probable
cause, was presented in the warrant affidavit, the fruits of the search conducted pursuant
to that warrant were admissible against them as well. In short, the evidence was not
suppressed with respect to any of the defendants.
28. 466 U.S. at 179.
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Then the Court held - under the rubric of the open-fields doc-
trine - that because the area searched was an open field, it was
not entitled to fourth amendment protection." In effect, the
Court begged the relevant question - whether society has an
interest in protecting the privacy of open fields - by defining
open fields as those areas in which society recognizes no privacy
interest. But if, as Katz suggested, the only proper issue is
whether society recognizes and is prepared to protect a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the invaded place, then recourse to
such circular reasoning was unnecessary (because whether the
area is called curtilage or open fields is irrelevant), and the blur-
ring of Karo's bright-line presumptions unjustified.
Soon after came Dow Chemical Co. v. United States30 and
California v. Ciraolo;31 it was time to pay the piper. In Dow, the
Environmental Protection Agency employed a commercial aerial
photographer who flew over Dow's 2,000-acre manufacturing
plant and, using a standard floor-mounted, aerial-mapping cam-
era, took photographs of the facility from altitudes of 12,000,
3,000 and 1,200 feet. Initially relying on Oliver's distinction be-
tween open fields and curtilage, the Court was quickly forced to
admit that the distinction, while instructive, was not controlling.
Dow's enclosed plant complex, as well as Oliver's marijuana
fields, fell "somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage. ' 3 2 In
a very real sense, the Court was admitting the irrelevance of the
distinction. Ultimately, the Court simply asked whether society
recognized as reasonable Dow's expectation of privacy from ae-
rial observation of its facility. The answer was precise. The ac-
tions of the EPA did not constitute a search prohibited by the
fourth amendment 33 because: 1) the intimate activities associ-
ated with family privacy do not extend to the uncovered, out-
door areas between buildings in a government-regulated com-
mercial complex; 2) the aerial photographs taken were of open
areas, without physical entry into the facility; and 3) the photo-
graphs, although enhancing human vision, revealed nothing that
29. Id. at 180.
30. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
31. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
32. 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
33. Id. at 1826-27.
1986]
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was not visible to the naked eye."
If those in the Court's gallery thought the rationale underly-
ing Dow's holding was limited to commercial property, they did
not have long to wait to discover their error. Later the same af-
ternoon, the Chief Justice handed down California v. Ciraolo,35
upholding a police officer's naked-eye aerial observations from
1,000 feet of a fenced-in area immediately adjacent to the
owner's house. Again, the Court cited Oliver's distinction be-
tween open fields and curtilage. Again, it was forced to admit
the distinction was less than perfect and not dispositive. In
Ciraolo, the area searched was a fifteen-by-twenty-five foot ma-
rijuana plot next to Ciraolo's house in his backyard surrounded
by a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence; it was unde-
niably within the curtilage 6
Applying the reasoning in Oliver, the lower court held that
the warrantless aerial observation of Ciraolo's yard violated the
fourth amendment.37 Not so, held the Chief Justice. Although
the marijuana plants were within the curtilage, that determina-
tion does not itself bar all police observation. For example,
noted the Court, regardless of the measures taken by an individ-
ual to restrict observation of his activities, the fourth amend-
ment has never been held to "preclude an officer's observations
from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and
which renders the activities clearly visible."3 8 The outcome-de-
terminative question is not whether the viewed area constituted
open fields or curtilage, but whether Ciraolo's expectation of pri-
vacy from aerial, as opposed to ground-level, observation is one
society is prepared to honor. Thus framed, the answer suggested
itself. The aerial observations by the officers took place within
public navigable airspace and in a physically nonintrusive man-
ner. Because police traveling in the public airways are not re-
quired "to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to
the naked eye"319 and even though the flight was not routine, but
was focused on the defendant's backyard, the warrantless over-
34. Id. at 1826.
35. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
36. Id. at 1810-11.
37. Id. at 1811.
38. Id. at 1812.
39. Id. at 1813.
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flight and concurrent naked-eye observations were constitution-
ally unobjectionable.'
4. Narrowing the Fourth Amendment's Reach:
Contraband
While the Court was busily containing Katz by narrowing
the protected curtilage and drawing a distinction of constitu-
tional dimensions between it and open fields, it was equally busy
on another front: contraband. In United States v. Place,4 1 the
Court upheld a warrantless canine sniff of a piece of luggage by
a narcotics detection dog because of the unintrusive nature of
that investigative technique and because "the sniff discloses only
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. ' 42 In
other words, a canine sniff - limited in both manner and infor-
mation obtained - does not constitute a search for the pur-
poses of the fourth amendment because it is contraband that is
sought.
That the Court is unwilling to recognize any reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in possessing contraband, particularly nar-
cotics, was made abundantly clear in United States v. Jacob-
sen.43  There, a Federal Express employee accidentally
discovered a damaged package that contained a white powder. A
Drug Enforcement Administration agent arrived, extracted sam-
ples, and ran a field drug test which revealed the substance to be
cocaine. The Court approved the warrantless examination by ad-
dressing three separate issues. First, because the agent's visual
examination and removal of the contents of the package did not
exceed the scope of the earlier private search, it violated no ex-
pectation of privacy which had not already been frustrated."
Second, a field test, just like a dog's sniff, reveals only the pres-
ence or absence of contraband; yet "Congress has de-
40. Id.
41. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
42. Id. at 707. Notice that the Court could have grounded its decision, as it did in
United States v. Knotts, on a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, see supra notes
15-17 and accompanying text, by holding that Place had no expectation of privacy in the
area intruded upon by the dog, i.e., the air surrounding the luggage. It chose, instead, a
broader rationale, using the fruits of the search to bootstrap its legitimacy.
43. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
44. Id. at 112.
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cided - and there is no question about its power to do
so - to treat the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine as il-
legitimate."45 Therefore, no judicially cognizable privacy interest
was compromised by the test. Finally, on balance, a destruction
of a trace amount of the contraband for test purposes, although
a seizure, was reasonable."
5. Recent Decisions and Their New Approach to Fourth
Amendment Applicability
In light of these decisions concerning contraband, there is a
valid argument that the "per se unreasonableness of warrantless
searches" sentiment which received its greatest voice in Coolidge
has been transformed ever so adroitly into the current view that
only those warrantless searches that are of houses are per se un-
reasonable. 47 The Court's recent declarations in Hudson v.
Palmer support the proposition that all other invasions - be
they searches or seizures - which take place outside the home,
particularly those involving contraband, are buoyed and there-
fore validated by society's overriding interest in the enforcement
of justice.48 In Hudson, the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment does not apply to searches of a prison cell because "society
is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective ex-
pectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison
cell .... -.
What other conclusions, if any, can be drawn from these re-
cent decisions regarding the application of the fourth amend-
ment? Has Coolidge's "per se unreasonablness of warrantless
searches" really been overruled? However cryptic, the answer
must be yes and no. While the Court continues to hold that war-
rantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, it does a
quick-footed end-run around Coolidge's interpretation of the
prohibitions of the fourth amendment by subsuming into the
45. Id. at 113.
46. Id. at 126.
47. While searches are discussed far more frequently than seizures, the analysis
brought to bear on each is the same. Any general statement as to searches, therefore,
should be read to include seizure as well. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
113 n.5 (1984) and cases cited therein.
48. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
49. Id. at 526.
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definitions of search and seizure the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" and "legitimate possessory interest" tests. When the
Court wants to admit the fruits of a contested activity, the
Court simply holds that the activity was not a search or seizure
at all and, therefore, not susceptible of fourth amendment cover-
age. It is small wonder the Court is often little understood by
the constable on the beat.
While the result of the Court's approach is probably the
same as that envisioned by the Framers, the means by which
that end is achieved is arguably quite at odds with the amend-
ment's clear language. With regard to warrantless actions, the
first clause of the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. Thus, the analysis is two-tiered: Was
the activity a search or seizure? And if so, was that search or
seizure unreasonable?
This is precisely the approach followed in New Jersey v.
T.L.. 50 There, faced with the warrantless search of a student's
purse by a school's vice-principal, the Court first addressed the
question of whether there had been a search at all. Holding that
the vice-principal - as a public school official - was acting in
an official governmental capacity, and that the student had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse,
the Court concluded that a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment had occurred. The Court then addressed the
question of whether the search was reasonable, noting that "al-
though 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in cer-
tain limited circumstances neither is required.' ,,51 In finding
that the vice-principal, although not having probable cause, did
have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search would
turn up evidence that the student had violated either the law or
the rules of the school, the Court upheld the search as
reasonable.52
The Court arguably could have - as in Katz and its prog-
eny - simply held that no "search" had occurred because
schoolchildren do not have any reasonable expectation of pri-
50. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
51. Id. at 743 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)).
52. Id. at 747.
1986]
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vacy in items they bring onto school grounds. However, it specif-
ically forsook that approach for the more historically correct and
logically coherent two-tiered analysis outlined above: The ques-
tioned activity was a search, but on balance, it was reasonable.
Indeed, in upholding a twenty-minute investigative stop of a ve-
hicle as reasonable in United States v. Sharpe,5 the Court again
embraced this analysis and hinted at its broadening application
by observing that the "Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a
guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 54
Most recently, a slim majority of the Court in New York v.
Class5 used this approach in upholding an officer's actions
where he stopped an automobile for a traffic violation and then
discovered a pistol under the driver's seat. It had come into
plain view only after the officer had reached into the passenger
compartment to remove some papers from the dashboard in or-
der to observe the Vehicle Identification Number. Once again,
rather than treating the officer's intrusion as a Katzian non-
search based on the lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy
in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, the Court specifically
held that the officer's actions in reaching into the car's interior
constituted a search which, on balance, was constitutionally per-
missible. Justice O'Connor weighed the nature and quality of the
intrusion (a limited reach into an area of diminished privacy)
against the importance of the governmental interests involved
(the detection of stolen, uninsured, unregistered, or unsafe vehi-
cles) and determined that the scales tipped in favor of allowing
the search."
This totality of the circumstances approach, as many of the
Supreme Court's decisions of the last several terms indicate,
readily lends itself to fourth amendment analysis.5 7 Nonetheless,
53. 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
54. Id. at 1573 (emphasis in original).
55. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
56. Id. at 968.
57. Consider the ease with which decisions on searches and seizures could be dis-
patched were the courts to adopt across the board this "plain meaning" approach to the
fourth amendment. There would be no grappling with doctrines of open fields, curtilages,
and the like. The first question would be a factual one: Was there a search, i.e., "an
examination to find something lost or concealed," or a seizure, i.e., "a taking into custody
or an exerting of control over," of "persons, houses, papers, . . . [or] effects"? If so,
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when dealing with other actions such as canine sniffs, field de-
tection tests, and beeper monitorings, rather than characterize
those activities as searches or seizures which are or are not rea-
sonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the Court
may continue to apply the Katz test and thereby find these ac-
tions to be non-searches or non-seizures. While this approach
may yield results less uniform than desired, it is an approach
firmly embedded in the law and may be expected to continue
unabated.
B. Satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment
The Court's recent flurry of activity has not been limited
solely to questions of fourth amendment applicability. It has
also dealt with the issue of whether, once triggered, the fourth
amendment and its requirements have been satisfied. This issue,
in turn, subsumes two legally independent questions: Was the
questioned activity conducted pursuant to a valid warrant? Or,
absent a warrant, does the activity qualify under some judicially
accepted exception?
1. Warranted Searches and Seizures
The requirements of the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment are clear: a warrant must be based on probable
cause, supported by oath, and be of sufficient particularity. The
latter two requirements are factual and are rarely the source of
confusion or serious controversy, while the former - probable
cause - is a child of the law and has engendered nothing but
confusion and controversy.
As early as 1813, Chief Justice Marshall defined "probable
cause" as "circumstances which warrant suspicion [and are] less
then - and only then - would a legal analysis be brought to bear on whether, given
the totality of the circumstances, the activity complained of was "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, i.e., did it violate some reasonable expectation of
privacy or some legitimate possessory interest? It is at this second tier that would be
grouped all those instances of warrantless searches and seizures that give such fits to
law-enforcement officials and courts alike: searches incident to arrest, searches of
automobiles, canine-sniffs, stop and frisks, searches of enclosed fields, the installations of
monitoring devices, etc. Each and every activity, once it has been determined to be a
search or seizure, would then be subject to the same balancing test to determine whether
the activity had been reasonable or not.
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than evidence which would justify condemnation." 8 Subsequent
attempts to define the term with more specificity are legion.
Sounding a recurrent theme, the Court, in Brinegar v. United
States,59 noted the probable cause standard to be a "practical
nontechnical conception" 60 which ought to be based on the "fac-
tual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."6
Eventually, and apparently dissatisfied with the disparate
results being reached by different courts with differing notions
of "probable cause," the Supreme Court attempted, in Aguilar v.
Texas62 and five years later in Spinelli v. United States, 63 to
lay down some more specific guidelines to be used by a magis-
trate in determining probable cause. The Court required that
some facts bearing on the "basis of knowledge" and "reliability"
of the informant be provided to the magistrate. This two-
pronged test soon became a law unto itself, and each prong an
inflexible, independent requirement applicable in every case in
which a warrant was requested or issued. In Illinois v. Gates,"
however, the Court announced that nothing could have been fur-
ther from their initial intent. Rather, the Court had intended
these two prongs to be "understood simply as closely inter-
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense,
practical question whether there is 'probable cause.' ",65 "Relia-
bility" and "basis of knowledge" were highly relevant in decid-
ing whether to issue a warrant, but by no means were they in-
tended to be controlling. In their stead, the Gates Court
reaffirmed "the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that tradi-
tionally has guided probable cause determinations."'60 In putting
an end to the practice of using one analysis when determining
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant and
a different approach when determining the existence of probable
58. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813), quoted in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
59. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
60. Id. at 176.
61. Id. at 175, quoted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983).
62. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
63. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
64. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id. at 233.
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cause for, say, the warrantless search of an automobile, the
Court set out one standard: whether there was a reasonable basis
for believing evidence of crime would be found in the place
searched. Probable cause, the Court held, is probable cause, re-
gardless of the context.
Similarly irrelevant is the nature of the items sought. In
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,67 the lower court suppressed five
allegedly obscene videocassette movies that had been seized pur-
suant to a warrant. Stressing that there was a higher probable-
cause standard for issuing warrants to seize items such as books
and movies than for issuing warrants to seize other evidence or
contraband, the court held that under this higher standard the
affidavits presented to the magistrate contained insufficient in-
formation to establish probable cause to believe the seized mov-
ies were obscene under New York law. 8 Not so, ruled the Su-
preme Court late in its 1985-1986 term. The Court "recognized
that the seizure of films or books on the basis of their content
implicates First Amendment concerns not raised by other kinds
of seizures," 9 but specifically held that these concerns, while
serving to highlight the importance of specific affidavits and crit-
ical magistrates, did not justify evaluating such warrant applica-
tions under a higher standard of probable cause than is used to
review warrant applications generally. Once again, when assess-
ing probable cause, the outcome-determinative issue is not the
context in which the question is raised or the item for which the
warranted or warrantless authorization is being sought, but
whether there is a fair probability evidence of crime will be
found in the area searched.
Once a magistrate has issued a search warrant pursuant to
his determination that probable cause existed, his decision
should not later be scrutinized by the courts in the form of a de
novo review. Citing a strong desire to encourage unfettered re-
course to the warrant process by law-enforcement officials, the
Gates Court emphasized that reviewing courts should pay great
deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. The
Court reasoned that anything short of this deferential standard
67. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
68. Id. at 1613.
69. Id. at 1614.
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of review would encourage police to resort to warrantless
searches, because the police, aware a warrant could later be in-
validated, would conduct a warrantless search "with the hope of
relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause
that might develop at the time of the search. 7 0
Notwithstanding the clear language of Gates, the Court was
forced in the following term to restate in much stronger terms
its positions on the standard to be used in determining probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant and on the amount of defer-
ence given magistrates by reviewing courts. In Massachusetts v.
Upton,'7 1 the Court chastised the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for continuing to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test
in determining de novo whether a warrant was lawfully issued
and again warned "[w]e did not merely refine or qualify the
'two-pronged test.' We rejected it as hyper technical .... " 7 The
lower court was also incorrect in the approach it took in review-
ing the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Rather than sim-
ply deciding whether the evidence presented had provided the
magistrate with a substantial basis for a finding of probable
cause - as mandated by Gates - the reviewing court con-
ducted a de novo probable cause determination. The Upton
Court was succinct: "We rejected just such after-the-fact, de
novo scrutiny in Gates. '7 8
It may be asserted with some measure of certainty, there-
fore, that the controlling question with regard to the issuance of
search warrants is whether, under the totality of the circum-
stances presented to the magistrate, a reasonable and prudent
person would believe contraband or evidence may be located in
the particular place alleged? Once that question is answered in
the affirmative, it remains for the reviewing court to concur so
long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for his
determination.
70. 462 U.S. at 236.
71. 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
72. Id. at 732.
73. Id. at 733.
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2. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
But what about those searches and seizures that for diverse
reasons are conducted without a warrant? There, too, the Court
has been active, promulgating a "few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions ' 74 to the warrant requirement. These
exceptions, for the purposes of this discussion, may be grouped
into six categories, divided according to the manner in which the
evidence was obtained: while in plain view, consent search, dur-
ing the exigencies of hot pursuit, automobile search, pursuant to
a stop and frisk, and search incident to arrest.75 Each shall be
examined by first looking at the traditional or accepted state-
ment of that exception, as set out in its leading case, and then
noting any major doctrinal refinements or changes of the last
several years.
a. Plain View
The plain view doctrine was first explicitly addressed in
1971 in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.76 According to that Court
74. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55.
75. While these groupings may facilitate discussion of these varied doctrines, it will
be noted that such classifications are far from perfect. Of the six groups, two - consent
and plain view - are arguably not as much exceptions to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement as much as they are instances of fourth amendment inapplicability;
and three - automobile, plain view, and hot pursuit - require probable cause, while
the other three do not. More important, treating these exceptions separately ignores the
fact that they can, and often do, overlap, e.g., the stop and frisk of the driver of an
automobile. Indeed, even the term "exception" is a misnomer (albeit one with the impri-
matur of the Supreme Court), because to call them exceptions implies that the fourth
amendment requires a warrant - a notion addressed in the preceeding section of this
article. Rather, the fruits of these warrantless activities are admissible, not because they
are exceptions, but because they are "reasonable" and therefore satisfy the fourth
amendment.
76. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Although the Court in Coolidge writes as though the doc-
trine were of respectable lineage, historical research indicates that - much like
Athena - the doctrine sprang full-grown from the plurality opinion in Coolidge. See
Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident"
Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1974). United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927) (holding that no search had occurred where cases of liquor were seen on the deck
of a motorboat by use of a Coast Guard seachlight); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
(holding that discovery of marijuana in full view on a kitchen counter during an arrest of
the apartment's occupants was not a search); and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968) (stating that the seizure of an automobile registration card by an officer who was
securing the vehicle was not a search, but a measure taken to protect the automobile
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(which struck down the warrantless seizure of an automobile
present at the scene of an arrest), evidence obtained pursuant to
a warrantless seizure by police is admissible only if three re-
quirements are met: the officer was lawfully situated when he
viewed the evidence, he came across it inadvertently, and it was
immediately apparent to him that the observed item might be
evidence of crime. While each of these factors has received much
passing mention by the Court, it should be noted that the only
case other than Coolidge in which the plain view doctrine has
received thorough treatment is Texas v. Brown."7 Accordingly,
there has been no definitive consensus on the precise basis or
limits of the doctrine. For example, while all of the cases which
have addressed this issue, even obliquely, have treated plain
view as distinct from a search (often holding a plain view seizure
to entail no search at all), the plurality opinion in Coolidge
makes the confusing statement that plain view does not occur
until a search is already in progress. 78 There appears to be no
support for this suggestion, however, particularly since the Court
has upheld "plain view" not only where the officers were in the
course of a search, but also where the plain view preceded a
search or where there was no search at all. Nonetheless, while
the doctrine's underpinnings are unclear, its existence is not.
Thus, in Brown, where during a stop of an automobile an officer
seized a heroin-filled balloon he had seen the driver drop onto
his seat, the Court affirmed the seizure and the doctrine, while
refining all three of Coolidge's tests.79
Brown listed as the first requirement that the officer be le-
gally situated when he first views the item and that the access to
the object have some prior justification under the fourth amend-
ment. 0 Notice the two distinct tiers of this requirement: not
only must the officer be legally situated when he sees the item,
but he must also have lawful access to the object in order to
while in police custody, and that once the officer had opened the car door, the registra-
tion was plainly visible) had all tangentially or implicitly recognized the plain view doc-
trine. It remained for Coolidge, however, to give it life.
77. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). In both cases only four justices joined in the plain view part
of the opinion.
78. 403 U.S. at 467.
79. Id. at 736-37.
80. Id. at 737.
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seize it.81 Although the first tier of this requirement would be
satisfied where, say, an officer, while walking along the sidewalk,
notices a marijuana plant in Mrs. Smith's kitchen window, the
officer would not be permitted to seize the plant unless he had
some additional justification permitting him to enter the house,
e.g., a warrant based on his observation or an exigent circum-
stance such as the possible destruction of the plant by Mrs.
Smith's son who saw the officer looking through the window. But
if that is the case, then this requirement is little more than a
logical application of the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment, and Justice Rehnquist was correct, at least from an
analytical perspective, when he suggested the plain view doc-
trine is better considered, "not as an independent 'exception' to
the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the
prior justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be." 8
However clear that assessment, the Court muddied the wa-
ters later that same term, in Illinois v. Andreas,8 3 when it noted
the plain view doctrine is grounded not on an officer's lawful
presence, but "on the proposition that once police are lawfully in
a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy in-
terest in that item is lost."" While such a less-than-perfectly
worded statement is understood when narrowly limited to the
particular facts of that case - a warrantless reopening of a
sealed container after a prior legal search - the Chief Justice's
dictum has nonetheless proven confusing to many courts. It
need not have. Bearing in mind the two tiers of lawful presence,
it becomes apparent the Chief Justice was suggesting that once
an item is seen in plain view, the owner loses his privacy interest
in the item, but not necessarily in the access to that item.
To return to the earlier example, then, although Mrs. Smith
may have lost her privacy interest in the marijuana plant, she
did not necessarily lose any expectation of privacy in the "ac-
cess" to the plant, i.e., the house. Such access must be indepen-
dently justified. Accordingly, the Brown plurality, using Coo-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 738-39.
83. 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (warrantless reopening of sealed container after prior legal
search and controlled delivery held valid absent substantial likelihood that container
contents were changed).
84. Id. at 771.
1986]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
lidge's three-part test, found that both parts of the requirement
of lawful presence had been met when a police officer stopped an
automobile at a routine driver's license checkpoint, shined his
flashlight into the car, and then seized the evidence viewed
therein. 5
A similar fact pattern was presented in New York v. Class.8 6
Recall that there the Court struggled with the question of
whether a police officer's penetration of an automobile to inspect
a vehicle identification number constituted a search. After de-
ciding it did, the Court rather perfunctorily held that the officer
was lawfully situated when, once inside the vehicle, he noticed
the handle of a pistol protruding from underneath the driver's
seat, seized the weapon, and arrested the driver. None of these
actions, observed the Court, violated the fourth amendment. In
Payton v. New York,81 on the other hand, the evidence was not
admitted because the police had made an illegal entry into the
defendant's apartment prior to seizing a shell casing which came
into plain view only after they entered the residence. The Court
there held that since the initial intrusion was illegal, it could not
be used to justify the officer's presence, without which the evi-
dence would not have been seen.8 8 Where the foundation is rot-
ted, the weight of "plain view" cannot be borne.
The second limitation on the plain view doctrine is that the
discovery be inadvertent. In Coolidge, the plurality stated that
the discovery of the evidence in plain view must not have been
anticipated, the fear being that the police would try to justify a
planned warrantless seizure by maneuvering themselves in plain
view of the object they want. While the Court in Brown noted
that fear, it cast some doubt on the continued vitality of that
requirement by citing several lower-court decisions that had dis-
pensed with the inadvertence requirement altogether. 89 More-
85. Brown, 460 U.S. at 739-40. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (An
officer, who had stopped a vehicle for routine check of the driver's license and the vehicle
registration, observed marijuana on the car floor during the inspection. The Court struck
down the seizure of the marijuana because, unlike Brown, the stop was random and was
not based on any reasonable suspicion.).
86. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
87. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
88. Id. at 601.
89. 460 U.S. at 743 n.8.
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over, Justice White's concurrence in Brown emphasized that the
Court did not endorse the inadvertence requirement.9 0 It ap-
pears, therefore, that if it retains any vitality at all, the require-
ment of inadvertence means only that the intrusion giving rise
to the plain view must not be a subterfuge for an otherwise ille-
gal seizure.
Finally, Coolidge held that before a plain view seizure is jus-
tifiable, the prosecution must show that the item's contraband
nature or evidentiary utility was immediately apparent to the
officer who seized it.' This "immediately apparent" language
seemed to suggest a higher standard than probable cause, but
just how much higher was unclear. In Payton, the Court set the
record straight: the officer need only have "probable cause to as-
sociate the property with criminal activity. ' 92 He need not be
certain, nor need he know the actual crime committed. The of-
ficer must simply, when first seeing the item, have a reasonable
belief that the viewed object has some connection with crime.
Thus, although all that the officer in Brown could see were small
opaque balloons, the Court held that the officer, based on his
law-enforcement experience, had probable cause to believe the
balloons contained an illicit substance.9 3 The seizure was lawful,
and the plain view doctrine continues as a valid exception.
b. Consent Searches
Equally valid, according to the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,94 are searches conducted pursuant
to consent. Much as with plain view, courts and commentators
alike disagree as to whether a consent search is really a waiver
rendering the fourth amendment inapplicable or a reasonable
action meeting the amendment's requirements. In either case,
such searches are lawful. In Schneckloth, the Court noted that
searches conducted pursuant to consent were "one of the specifi-
cally established exceptions ' 95 to the fourth amendment's war-
90. Id. at 744 (White, J., concurring).
91. 403 U.S. at 466.
92. 445 U.S. at 587.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
94. 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent of one of six passengers of a car to search that car
held valid).
95. Id. at 219.
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rant requirement and that for a consent to be valid, it must have
been "freely and voluntarily given." 96 There was nonetheless "a
square conflict of views between the state and federal courts '97
as to what facts demonstrate "voluntarily given." Rejecting the
notion that any single factor is dispositive, the Court once again
embraced a totality of the circumstances approach. In particu-
lar, the Court held that when the subject is not in custody, the
prosecution need not demonstrate that the subject knew of his
right to refuse, but only that the consent was not the result of
any duress or coercion. That the Court meant what it said in
Schneckloth - that no single factor would be dispositive in de-
termining whether a consent had been voluntarily given - was
made clear three years later in United States v. Watson."
There, even though at the time of the consent the defendant was
in custody and was not informed of his right to refuse, the Court
upheld the consent as voluntary because of the presence of sev-
eral other factors: there was no evidence of any duress or coer-
cion by the police, the consent was given in a public street by an
intelligent and well-educated individual, and the defendant had
been given his Miranda"9 warnings. 100
The similarities between the consent and the plain view
doctrines became even more apparent in Florida v. Royer.Y"1 In
that case, a suspect who fit a "drug-courier profile"'0 2 was ap-
proached at an airport by detectives who asked him to accom-
pany them to a small room. Once inside, the agents retrieved the
suspect's luggage without his consent and asked him if they
could search its contents. The Court struck down the search as
involuntary, distinguishing it from United States v. Menden-
96. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (search of house was unlaw-
ful because defendant's grandmother consented to search only after police officer told
her he had a search warrant).
97. 412 U.S. at 223.
98. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
100. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25.
101. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
102. Id. at 493 n.2. The "drug-courier profile" is a set of characteristics found to be
typical of persons transporting illegal drugs. In Royer's case, these characteristics in-
cluded that he was young (between 25-35), casually dressed, and carrying heavy luggage;
appeared pale and nervous, looking around at other people; paid for his ticket in cash
with a large number of bills; and wrote only his name and destination on the airline
ticket.
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hall,103 where the Court had upheld as consensual the search of
a suspect's luggage, which took place after she had been de-
tained at a Drug Enforcement Administration airport office. The
Court noted that in Mendenhall the predicate detention of the
defendant had been reasonable and lawful and that the defend-
ant had expressly been told that she was free to decline to con-
sent to the search.104 In Royer, on the other hand, the detention
preceding the consent was held to be illegal and, therefore, to
have tainted any consent given during its span.10 5 What may be
adduced from the Schneckloth-Royer line of cases, then, is that
one of the most important factors used in determining the vol-
untariness - and hence validity - of consensual searches is
the lawfulness or reasonableness of the actions by the police
leading up to the giving of the consent. In short, if when the
consent was given, the parties were lawfully postured, then the
subsequent search is probably valid and the fruits thereof ad-
missible. If, conversely, the parties were not so postured, then
the consent will probably be found to have been involuntary,
and its fruits poison. So framed, the consent doctrine appears in
reality to be yet another legitimate, commonsense application of
the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.
c. Hot Pursuit
The next two topics may be grouped together. Both arise
due to emergency or exigent circumstances, both dissolve once
the predicate exigency is extinguished, and both require proba-
ble cause. Where this exigency is some threat to life and the
probable cause is that a violent crime has just been committed,
the doctrine is commonly called "hot pursuit." Where, however,
the exigency is the likelihood of the disappearance of the auto-
motive container in which there is probable cause to believe
some evidence of crime is contained, the doctrine is termed the
"automobile exception." The former shall be addressed first.
In Warden v. Hayden,'06 the Supreme Court was faced with
the warrantless entry into, and search of, a house by police of-
103. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
104. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503-04 n.9.
105. Id. at 507-08.
106. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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ficers. Stressing that an armed robbery had just taken place and
that the suspect had entered the residence less than five minutes
before the police arrived, the Court upheld the warrantless ac-
tions because "the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative. 10 7 Specifically, the Court held that such "hot pur-
suit" searches and seizures would be upheld where there is prob-
able cause to believe that a violent crime has just been commit-
ted, that the individual who committed it is in the house, and
that there is need for immediate action because delay would
gravely endanger the officer's lives or the lives of others. 108 Ac-
cordingly, the Court upheld not only a search of the entire house
for Hayden, but also an examination of areas - even a washing
machine - where a weapon might have been hidden.10 9
While some contended the acceptance of the hot pursuit
doctrine heralded the beginning of a steady erosion of the fourth
amendment's protections, the Court soon indicated the doctrine
would be narrowly construed and even more narrowly applied.
In United States v. United States District Court,"0 the Court
noted that since the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected," ' the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to
demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify such actions. Early
in 1984, the Court was given the opportunity to show just how
heavy this burden was.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,"2 the police made a warrantless ar-
rest of the defendant in his home for driving while under the
influence of alcohol (DUI). Although the offense had occurred
only minutes before the arrest, the Court was emphatic in ruling
that the warrantless nighttime entry by the police had violated
the fourth amendment. The Court noted there was no immedi-
ate or continuous pursuit of the offender from his abandoned car
and that Wisconsin statutes treat DUI as a civil, nonjailable
traffic offense." 3 Opining that one of the most important factors
107. Id. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
108. 387 U.S. 298-99.
109. Id. at 299-300.
110. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
111. Id. at 313.
112. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
113. Id. at 753-54.
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in determining the validity of a hot pursuit search or seizure is
the gravity of the underlying offense, the Court found that
Welsh's offense and Wisconsin's treatment of it did not justify
the officer's entry into the defendant's home. 1 4 While stopping
short of requiring the predicate offense to be a felony, the Court
did cite with approval several lower-court decisions which had so
held." 6 It may be asserted, therefore, that in order for the hot
pursuit doctrine to justify a warrantless entry into a home for
the purpose of either an arrest or a search, the pursuit must fol-
low hard upon the commission of a violent felony and must be
reasonably necessary either to prevent physical harm to the of-
ficer and the public or - arguably - to avoid the destruction
of evidence. Within such clearly defined limits, the doctrine of
hot pursuit remains firmly grounded in the jurisprudence of the
fourth amendment.
d. Vehicle Searches
A doctrine of similar genealogy, but greater moment, con-
cerns evidence obtained from automobiles and was first recog-
nized in the landmark decision of Carroll v. United States."16 In
that case, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of
an automobile because the police had probable cause to believe
that bootleg liquor was being transported inside." 7 Due to the
inherent mobility of motor vehicles, the possibility existed that
the vehicle and its evidence would be gone by the time a warrant
was secured. Noting that the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures necessarily entailed
the recognition of a distinction between searches of permanent
structures and those of mobile ones, the Court concluded that
114. Id. at 751-54.
115. Id. at 752-53.
116. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). It is crucial to a proper understanding of the analytical
underpinnings of the automobile doctrine that it be viewed independently of the several
other doctrines with which it often co-exists. Thus, the search of a motor vehicle may be
valid as an incident to a lawful arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); as pur-
suant to a lawful consent, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); as a product of
plain view, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); or as motivated by safety con-
cerns for either the property within the vehicle or the physical well-being of the police
and members of the general public, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
117. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
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vehicles, because of their mobility, could be searched without a
warrant upon facts which would not justify the warrantless
search of a house, provided that at the time of the search there
was probable cause to believe that evidence of crime would be
found.'18 Thus framed, the doctrine appeared to require the
presence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Nonetheless, in Chambers v. Maroney,"9 the Court upheld
the warrantless search of an automobile even though the search
occurred after both the automobile and its occupants had been
taken to the police station and were under police control. 20
Stressing Carroll's "constitutional difference between houses
and cars,' 12' the Court observed that there had been probable
cause to search the vehicle when it was stopped. Since the same
probable cause still existed at the station house, the search at
the station was lawful. What the Court failed to address, how-
ever, was the fact that the exigency - that "the car's contents
may never be found again if a warrant must be ob-
tained' 2 - was extinguished before the search occurred. Ar-
guably, therefore, the Carroll doctrine ought not to have ap-
plied. Justice White attempted to gloss over this apparent flaw
by noting that once the car arrived at the police station there
was no practical difference between an immediate search with-
out a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant could
be obtained. 2 3
It remained, however, for the Court in a string of cases cul-
minating in United States v. Chadwick 2 4 to explain fully: "The
118. Id. at 153.
119. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 52. Given the advance of technology in such areas as mobile homes, it
becomes increasingly important to set out those factors that might be relevant in deter-
mining whether a hybrid structure more resembles a home or an automobile for the pur-
poses of the fourth amendment. In California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985), the
Court concluded that a motor home found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes and with ready access to public highways, more resembled a car
than a house and could, therefore, be searched without a warrant under the automobile
doctrine.
122. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
123. Id. at 51-52.
124. 433 U.S. 1 (1977); See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which sur-
rounds the automobile. ' 25 Acknowledging they had often sus-
tained "warrantless searches of vehicles ... in cases in which the
possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it de-
stroyed were remote, if not nonexistent, 1 26 Chadwick admitted
that the Carroll doctrine had undergone change since its incep-
tion. Specifically, although it was initially based on the actual
mobility of automobiles, the doctrine has come to rest on their
inherent mobility and, to a greater extent, on the notion that
individuals attach a lesser expectation of privacy to their cars
than they do to their homes. Such diminished privacy interest is
the result of an automobile's operation (traveling "public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view"127); its regulation ("[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are sub-
jected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and
controls"1 2 8); and its nature ("we are aware of the danger to life
and property posed by vehicular traffic"' 2 9). It follows, therefore,
that a vehicle need not be capable of flight in order for the auto-
mobile doctrine to apply.
While Chadwick had settled one issue - that of the ra-
tionale underlying the automobile doctrine - it proceeded to
raise two far more substantive ones: When does the doctrine jus-
tify the search of closed containers within the automobile? And
how soon after the car is immobilized must the search occur to
qualify as valid under the automobile doctrine? Chadwick in-
volved the warrantless search of a locked 200-pound footlocker
in the trunk of an automobile. Noting that the police had proba-
ble cause to seize the footlocker before it was placed in Chad-
wick's car, the Court struck down the search of the footlocker as
125. 433 U.S. at 12.
126. Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441-42).
127. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
128. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
129. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979). The Court nonetheless struck
down an officer's random stop of a motorist for a check of his driver's license and vehi-
cle's registration. "An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy .... Id. at 622. In New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960
(1986), however, the Court upheld the officer's reaching into the car for the vehicle iden-
tification number, because the stop was not random (the officer had observed Class driv-
ing above the speed limit) and because under New York law the VIN should have been
visible from outside the car.
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invalid. 130 Two years later, on facts similar to those in Chadwick,
the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders,'3' struck down the warrant-
less search of a locked suitcase which had been placed in the
trunk of a vehicle. In a separate concurrence, the Chief Justice
opined that "[blecause the police officers had probable cause to
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana
before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab, their duty to
obtain a search warrant before opening it is clear ... ,, "" In
sum, because it was the luggage, and not the automobile in
which it was coincidentally placed, that was the suspected locus
of the contraband, the automobile doctrine could not be used to
justify any subsequent warrantless search of the luggage.
There soon followed Robbins v. California,'33 where the
Court again struck down the search of a closed container - this
time the warrantless opening of packages wrapped in opaque
plastic discovered in the luggage compartment of a station
wagon during a lawful warrantless search of the vehicle. This de-
cision seemed to suggest that a warrantless search of a closed
container found in an automobile could never be sustained as
part of a warrantless search of the automobile itself. Unhappy
with that implication, the Court, in the following term in United
States v. Ross, 34 set out to clear up the substantial confusion
engendered by the Robbins decision. In Ross, the Court upheld
the warrantless search of a closed paper bag discovered in the
trunk of an automobile during a search of that vehicle. 18 In so
doing, the Court observed that the scope of a warrantless search
of a container found in an automobile is defined, not by the na-
ture or placement of the container, but "by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that [contraband] may be found."' 3  Thus - rejecting Rob-
bins - the Court held that if there is probable cause to believe
evidence will be found somewhere in the vehicle, then the officer
may search the entire vehicle and any containers in which evi-
130. 433 U.S. at 13.
131. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
132. Id. at 766 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
133. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
134. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
135. Id. at 825.
136. Id. at 824.
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dence might be found. At the same time affirming Chadwick and
Sanders, the Court also held that if the police have focused their
suspicion on a particular container that is later placed in a car,
then neither the car nor the container may be searched without
a warrant.13
Although the issue of the scope of the automobile doctrine
may have been well-settled by Ross, the question of when the
actual search must occur remains largely unsettled. Again, the
rationale behind the automobile doctrine is two-fold: a lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in vehicles than in houses and the inherent
mobility of vehicles. But, as was seen in Chadwick, the absence
of the potential for flight - through, for example, police cus-
tody of the vehicle - does not preclude the application of the
doctrine to validate a warrantless search, provided there is prob-
able cause to believe evidence of crime is contained somewhere
within the vehicle. The upshot is clear: the justification to con-
duct a warrantless search of an automobile does not disappear
merely because the vehicle has been immobilized or taken into
custody. This suggests there is no requirement that any warrant-
less search be conducted immediately after the vehicle is seized.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld a warrantless search of
an automobile that took place seven days after the seizure of the
vehicle pending forfeiture proceedings, 138 and one in which the
driver was already in custody in a nearby patrol car.139 In Flor-
ida v. Myers," 0 the Court even upheld a second warrantless
search of a vehicle eight hours after it had been impounded by
the police and while it was located in a locked, secure area. In so
doing, the Court stressed that "the justification to conduct such
a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been
immobilized.'
Finally, in United States v. Johns,4 the Court upheld the
warrantless search of several packages three days after they were
removed from the seized vehicle, setting out in some detail the
present state of the law regarding the timing of an automobile
137. Id.
138. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
139. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982).
140. 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
141. Id. at 382 (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261).
142. 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
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search: although the Carroll doctrine originally required proba-
ble cause plus exigent circumstances in the form of an automo-
bile's inherent mobility in order to justify a warrantless search,
it no longer does so in all cases. In particular, Johns held that,
although the initial search or seizure of a vehicle generally still
requires probable cause and the exigency of the possibility of
flight, once the vehicle is lawfully in police custody there is no
requirement that any subsequent search occur either immedi-
ately or even soon after the seizure for it to be valid.143 This is
because the justification for the subsequent search rests, not on
the exigency, but on the combination of probable cause, safety
to the seizing officer, accounting for the seized property, and the
diminished expectation of privacy society posits in automobiles.
While many particulars remain to be settled, this doctrine's gen-
eral outlines have been clearly set by the Court, and the future
bodes little chance of any retrenchment of its recent expansions.
e. Investigative Stop and Frisk
The presence of, and distinctions between the final two ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement - search incident to ar-
rest and stop and frisk - turn on the characterization of their
predicate actions. If the initial intrusion constitutes an arrest,
then any succeeding search incident to that arrest is tested for
validity by one set of criteria. If, on the other hand, the predi-
cate intrusion falls short of an arrest, resembling more a brief,
investigative stop, then any subsequent search is tested for va-
lidity by an entirely different set of criteria. The first step,
therefore, in an analysis of either a search incident to arrest or a
stop and frisk is to determine the nature of the predicate action
and, hence, which doctrine, if any, applies. The less intrusive of
the two will be addressed first.
In Terry v. Ohio,'44 a police officer observed two men walk-
ing back and forth past a store window, pausing some two dozen
times to stare into the window. Suspecting that the men were
143. Id. at 887. The Court in Johns specifically left open the question of how long
the officers may retain possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a
vehicle search, noting only that if an owner can show that the delay "adversely affected a
privacy or possessory interest," then the subsequent search would be unreasonable. Id.
144. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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preparing to rob the store, the officer seized the defendant and
searched him for weapons. The Court specifically noted that the
officer's actions did not amount to an arrest; that, in any event,
the officer did not have probable cause to make an arrest; and
that a police officer's restraint on an individual's freedom to
walk away, no matter how minimal, constitutes a seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment The real issue in Terry
was whether the officer's actions were reasonable under the
fourth amendment. 45 The answer to this question has become
almost larger than life in the last two decades. Finding that the
police officer, who had thirty years' experience in law enforce-
ment, could have reasonably assumed, based on his observations,
both that the men were contemplating a daylight robbery of the
store and that they were armed, Chief Justice Warren upheld
the officer's actions. 46 In particular, the Court determined that
when an officer comes across what he believes to be suspicious
persons, he may, in order to protect both himself and others,
"conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. '147
Standing alone, the Terry opinion raised as many questions
as it answered. Doubtless aware of this, the Court, on the same
day it handed down Terry, also decided Sibron v. New York, 48
where it struck down a stop and frisk which was, at least superfi-
cially, similar to the one upheld in Terry. In Sibron, the officer
stopped an individual who he suspected was carrying narcotics;
the officer placed his hand into the individual's pocket, pulling
out a glassine envelope filled with heroin. 49 Stressing that the
officer never expressed any fear of bodily harm or any suspicion
the accused was armed, the Court held that the search was inva-
lid as unjustified at its inception. 150 It also held that even had
the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the accused was
armed, the scope of the search - thrusting his hand into the
accused's pocket rather than an external pat down - was so
145. Id. at 15-16.
146. Id. at 30.
147. Id.
148. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
149. Id. at 45.
150. Id. at 64.
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unrelated to that justification as to render the entire search un-
lawful.1'3 In short, in order for a frisk to be lawful, it must be
justified both at its inception, as based on a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is armed, and in its scope, as a limited explora-
tion for weapons. The glassine envelope of heroin the officer re-
trieved from the defendant's pocket was ruled inadmissible."52
Although both Terry and Sibron treated the stop and frisk
together, subsequent decisions by the Court have more correctly
addressed them as distinct from each other. For example, in Ad-
ams v. Williams,"s3 the Court held that in order for a weapons
search to be justified under a stop and frisk theory, the stop pre-
ceding the search must also have been lawful.154 In Adams, an
officer received a tip from an informer, with whom the officer
had prior dealings, that an individual seated in a nearby car was
carrying narcotics and had a gun in his possession. 55 In uphold-
ing the officer's subsequent stop and frisk of the defendant, the
Court greatly refined the law as first set out four years earlier in
Terry and Sibron, resting its decision on two grounds. First, stop
and frisk are two actions each of which must be independently
justified, with an illegal stop tainting an otherwise valid frisk.' 6
And second, the reasonable suspicion for both a stop and frisk
may be based on hearsay as well as on personal observation.' 57
Such holdings, taken together with Sibron and Terry, left little
doubt as to the procedure required in assessing the admissibility
of any evidence derived from a stop and frisk. The stop must be
tested, first, in its inception, and second, in its scope. Then, and
only after the stop has been found valid, may the frisk be simi-
larly tested. In this regard, and addressing all four tiers of the
analysis, no fewer than eight cases in the last several terms of
the Supreme Court have had occasion to consider the present
state of the law of investigative detentions.
151. Id. at 65.
152. Id. at 64-66.
153. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
154. Id. at 149. See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (frisk for
weapons was permissible when an officer observed a bulge in the jacket of a man who
had been ordered out of his car after being stopped for a traffic violation).
155. 407 U.S. at 144-45.
156. Id. at 147-48.
157. Id. at 143.
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In 1983, in Michigan v. Long,' the Court was faced with
the question of the geographic bounds of the scope of an other-
wise valid Terry stop and frisk. Defendant Long's car had run
into a ditch and the police had stopped to investigate. After no-
ticing a knife on the floor of the car, the officer patted Long
down and searched the inside of the car.' Stressing the particu-
larly hazardous nature of roadside encounters between police
and suspects, the Court held that a limited search of the passen-
ger compartment of a car is permissible under Terry if the of-
ficer has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and
could gain immediate control of any weapons in the vehicle. The
search in Long was upheld.' 60
In the same year, the Court also began to address the tem-
poral bounds of an investigative detention. In United States v.
Place,'' Drug Enforcement Administration agents, suspecting
that the defendant was carrying narcotics, stopped him at an
airport terminal and seized his luggage for ninety minutes, at
which time they used a drug-detection dog on the luggage. 6 '
Specifically holding that the initial stop of Place was valid,'"
the Court nonetheless struck down the subsequent search of the
luggage because the ninety-minute delay exceeded the permissi-
ble scope of a Terry stop.164 Similarly, in Florida v. Royer,'6 5
state narcotics officers, having determined that the defendant fit
a drug-courier profile, detained him at the airport, took both his
airline ticket and driver's license, and then seized his luggage.
Once again, the Court held that the stop of the defendant on
less than probable cause was permissible, but that the actions of
the officers in taking the defendant to a large storage closet and
in retaining his airline ticket exceeded the scope of Terry.'66
It was beginning to appear as though the Burger Court, so
active in other fourth amendment areas, was content with the
158. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
159. Id. at 1035-36.
160. Id. at 1050-51.
161. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
162. Id. at 698-99.
163. Id. at 706.
164. Id. at 710.
165. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
166. Royer, 460 U.S. at 507-08.
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Warren Court's explication of investigative detentions. Then
came 1985 and the dike burst. In a string of five cases, four of
which were decided in favor of the government, the Court ex-
panded the types of suspicion that may justify a stop and the
sources of information which may be used to raise those suspi-
cions. The Court also specifically refused to establish a per se
rule regarding the length of such detentions and equally clearly
indicated its continuing transfixion with the narcotics trade.
The only case decided in favor of the defendant, Hayes v.
Florida,167 was simply a reaffirmation of an earlier Court holding
some sixteen years earlier.168 In Hayes, the police, without con-
sent or probable cause, transported a suspect from his home to
the police station for fingerprinting. 169 The Court ruled that
such actions more resembled arrests - thereby triggering the
fourth amendment's probable-cause requirement - than they
did investigative stops, which required only reasonable suspi-
cion.170 Conversely, the government's victories were more
substantial.
In Florida v. Rodriguez,'7' a Florida trial court suppressed
evidence found in a drug courier's luggage during a search at the
airport, holding the defendant's furtive behavior and statement
to his companion, "let's get out of here," had not furnished the
officers with proper grounds for a Terry stop.172 Acting summa-
rily, the Supreme Court reversed, noting that such actions did in
fact constitute articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the de-
fendant's brief detention. 78
Further expanding the sort of suspicion upon which a Terry
stop and frisk may be based, the Court handed down a decep-
tively significant decision in United States v. Hensley,17 4 where
officers from one police department, based on a bulletin from
167. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
168. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (defendant's fingerprints taken during
illegal detention inadmissible).
169. Hayes, 105 S. Ct. at 1645.
170. Id. at 1646-47. Note how Justice White, writing for a five-Justice majority,
hedged his bet by opining that, were the police able to fingerprint a suspect on the spot
and in a reasonable fashion, such actions might fit within the limits of Terry.
171. 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984).
172. Id. at 309-10.
173. Id. at 310-11.
174. 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
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another department, stopped an individual suspected of armed
robbery. In striking down the stop and subsequent frisk, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
Terry stops are not applicable to completed crimes and that po-
lice from one jurisdiction may not make a Terry stop based on
the articulable suspicions of another jurisdiction. Suspicion, they
held, is simply not a transferable commodity." 5 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor observed that the Court of
Appeals was wrong on both counts. As to whether an individual
could be stopped as suspected of a completed crime, rather than
of an imminent or ongoing one, the Court conceded the justify-
ing exigencies of crime prevention and public safety were not as
pronounced for completed conduct, but that - once
again - on balance such stops fell within the rationale underly-
ing Terry.' 76 Hensley held that - at least for felonies - the
government's interests served by the ability to make brief, non-
probable-cause stops for completed crimes outweigh the intru-
sion upon an individual's right to avoid such limited stops. 177 As
to the second issue - the transferability of suspicion from one
police department to another, without transfering also all the
facts upon which the suspicion was based - the Court again
ruled in favor of the government. In so holding, the Court set
out two requirements: the department which issued the bulletin
must have had a reasonable suspicion the named individual was
involved in the crime; and an objective reading of the bulletin
must indicate that the stopped individual was wanted, at least
for questioning, by the issuing jurisdiction.' 8 This authority to
stop, however, was not unlimited. While the stopping officer
could detain Hensley in order to ask him a few questions and
inform him that he was wanted for questioning in another juris-
diction, it would have exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry
stop had the officer detained the suspect until the issuing de-
partment had the opportunity to question him.'79
Having thus addressed and significantly expanded the vari-
175. Id. at 679.
176. Id. at 680-81.
177. Id. at 681.
178. Id. at 681-83.
179. Id. at 684.
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ous bases upon which a stop or frisk may be initiated, the Court
next turned to the issue earlier raised in Place and Royer: the
temporal bounds of such actions. In United States v. Sharpe,10
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the twenty-minute detention of a truck camper and its
driver, based on an admittedly reasonable suspicion the camper
was loaded with marijuana, was illegal because the length of the
driver's detention had turned the investigatory stop into an ar-
rest without the requisite probable cause. 18 Focusing solely on
whether the length of the detention was unreasonable, the Su-
preme Court held that the issue turns, not on the actual length
of the stop, but on whether the officer's actions during the de-
tention were reasonably related to, and rendered necessary by,
the particular circumstances of the stop. 82 The Court found the
delay in Sharpe was attributable solely to the actions of the two
defendants, who split up when first approached by the officers.
Once the officer caught up with fleeing defendant, Sharpe, the
officer acted reasonably and diligently. The somewhat prolonged
detention, accordingly, was legitimate. 8 '
The Sharpe decision did not conflict with earlier decisions
of the Court.18 4 In earlier decisions, such as Royer1 85 and Duna-
way v. New York, 86 the detentions had turned into de facto ar-
rests, not because of the duration of the stops, but because of
what the officers did during the detentions. In Dunaway, the
suspect was detained and interrogated at a police station, while
in Royer, the suspect was confined in a small airport room for
questioning. The thrust of the Court's holding was precise: there
is simply no "hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry
stop."' 87 Instead, the Court will look to all the factors in-
volved - the interests served and the intrusion suffered - to
180. 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
181. 712 F.2d 65 (1983).
182. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1574-76.
183. Id. at 1576.
184. Id. at 1575.
185. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
186. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
187. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1575. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
(upholding the seizure of a person who was leaving his home as police officers arrived to
execute a warrant to search the premises for narcotics, finding that it was reasonable for
the officers to detain Summers for the duration of the proper search).
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determine whether, on balance, the officer's actions were
reasonable.
Whether the Court meant what it said in Sharpe was
quickly put to the test in United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez.1 88 There, the Court was faced with a sixteen-hour de-
tention at an airport of a suspected alimentary-canal drug smug-
gler. Taking notice of the "veritable national crisis in law
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics,"' 1 the
Court held a detention at the border is justified at its inception
if, given the totality of the circumstances and even absent many
outward signs of illegal activity, the stopping officers reasonably
suspect the traveler is engaged in narcotics smuggling or other
criminal activity.190
Holding that the stop of Montoya de Hernandez was valid,
the Court passed on to the more complex issue of the scope of
the stop. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the detention was
longer than any previously upheld by the Court, but on balance,
nonetheless found the length of the detention to be reasona-
ble.191 Again stressing that the scope of the detention be mea-
sured, not by time, but by the stopping officer's actions, the
Court noted that suspicions of alimentary-canal smuggling can-
not be either confirmed or disproved in the time ordinarily al-
lowed for a Terry stop unless an X-ray is used. 2 In Montoya de
Hernandez, however, the defendant had refused to consent to an
X-ray. Moreover, during her sixteen-hour wait, the defendant
had also refused to defecate until the officers obtained a court
order for an X-ray and rectal search. Thus, observed the Court,
the entire length of the stop was due solely to the defendant's
decisions to attempt to smuggle drugs into the country, to refuse
to submit to an X-ray, and to refuse to produce a monitored
bowel movement. She could not, on the one hand, be so adamant
188. 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
189. Id. at 3309.
190. Id. at 3310-11. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (uphold-
ing brief detention at border of individual suspected of escorting illegal aliens into this
country); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the use of
permanent checkpoints at the Mexico-United States border); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (upholding vehicle stops by roving border patrol agents along
the Mexican border to ascertain citizenship).
191. Montoya, 105 S. Ct. at 3311-13.
192. Id. at 3312.
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in her refusal to comply with the reasonable requests of law-en-
forcement officials and, on the other hand, be heard to complain
about the predictable results of her actions.
The highly specialized context of Montoya de Hernandez's
detention - a border search of a recalcitrant, alimentary-canal
drug smuggler - prevents the drawing of any generalized con-
clusions applicable in other contexts. However, two sentiments
suggest themselves: the Court has declared an all-out war on
drug smuggling, and the Court refuses to set any per se rule as
to the length of investigative detentions. 9"
What may be gleaned from the Court's recent treatment of
Terry stop and frisks are several broad-based conclusions. First,
any time evidence is derived from a Terry frisk, both the stop
and the frisk must satisfy the fourth amendment in order for the
evidence to be admissible. For a stop to be valid, there must be
an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person stopped
is somehow involved in a past, present, or imminent crime, and
the actions of the stopping officers must be reasonably re-
lated - in time and instrusiveness - to the basis of the stop.
For a frisk to be valid, it must be based on an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that the frisked person may be armed, and
it must be limited to an external pat-down and, if applicable, a
sweep of the immediate area. What must be kept in mind in an
analysis of such actions is that investigative detentions are gov-
erned by a very fluid concept: totality of the circumstances. The
Court tilts the balancing scales more in the government's favor
where its interests are heightened - such as during roadside
encounters, at its borders, or involving illicit drug trade - and
more in the individual's favor where his interests are
stronger - such as in the home and other areas in which soci-
ety posits a reasonable expectation of privacy. Having struck
such a precarious balance in such a potentially explosive area,
193. In this regard, compare United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983), where the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless, suspicionless boarding of a
vessel near a port of entry by customs officials. Noting that the boarding of the sailboat
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court stressed that its holding should not be applied to other contexts. For
example, while the boarding of a vessel near the border is reasonable, the similar random
and suspicionless stopping of automobiles on a public highway near the border would not
be. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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the Court can do little but expect much future activity in this
area of the law.
f. Searches Incident to Arrest
The final topic, the search conducted incident to a valid ar-
rest, has received relatively scant treatment during the last sev-
eral terms. The first issue here is the nature of the action pre-
ceding the search. Once this action has been determined to be a
lawful arrest based on the requisite probable cause, attention
then focuses on the nature of the search from which the evi-
dence derived. In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that
an officer, upon a lawful arrest, may search the "area 'within
[the arrestee's] immediate control,'" often called the Chimel pe-
rimeter.'" The officer need not have any reason to believe the
search will turn up either weapons or evidence. The authority to
conduct the search - while generally based upon the need to
disarm the arrestee and to discover evidence - is actually es-
tablished by the very fact of the arrest, with no additional justi-
fication being necessary. 95 The only question before any court,
therefore, is whether the scope of the search was both tempo-
rally and spatially commensurate with the confines of Chimel.
Realizing that "[a] police officer's determination as to how
and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has ar-
rested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment,"196 a majority of
the courts, to include the Supreme Court, have adopted an
equally ad hoc approach to determine whether a place searched
was within an area the searching officer could have reasonably
believed the arrestee could reach. Thus, in United States v.
Chadwick,197 where an officer searched Chadwick's 200-pound
footlocker at a police station an hour and a half after Chadwick
had been arrested and after the footlocker had been reduced to
the exclusive control of the police, the Court easily held the ac-
194. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (search of defendant's home,
which went far beyond area from within which he might have obtained weapons, was
illegal and his burglary conviction was overturned).
195. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (officer who arrested defendant
could fully search him even where the arrest was for a traffic violation and even though
the officer did not suspect that the defendant was armed or dangerous).
196. Id. at 235.
197. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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tions to be illegal and not a search incident to arrest. Once the
property was so reduced, there simply was "no longer any dan-
ger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a
weapon or destroy evidence." ' Absent such exigencies, a search
cannot qualify as one incident to arrest.
Notwithstanding what seemed to be a rather clear-cut ap-
proach to the permissible scope of a search incident to ar-
rest - namely, to determine whether the officer reasonably be-
lieved the arrestee could have reached the area searched - the
Court was soon forced to admit that in many contexts such an
approach had failed to produce either a straightforward rule or a
workable definition of Chimel's area within the immediate con-
trol of the arrestee. 199 New York v. Belton20 0 addressed one such
context: the arrest of the driver or passenger of an automobile.
Noting how frequently this factual situation arises and how
widespread the confusion is, both by officers as to the scope of
their authority and by individuals as to the extent of their con-
stitutional protections, the Belton court decided to forsake its
approved ad hoc approach and set out to "determine the mean-
ing of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic
context."'201 The Court's holding was precise: Where an officer
has made a lawful arrest of the occupant of an automobile, "he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile, 2 2 to include any
containers found therein, but not including the closed trunk of
that automobile. This bright line rule is justified, the Court
stressed, because the search is based, not on the notion that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the car or its contents, but on
the fact that the arrest itself justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have.203 It logically follows that
any containers found in the passenger compartment may be
198. Id. at 15.
199. See LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures".
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 127, 141.
200. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (police officer stopped automobile for speeding and, after
smelling and observing marijuana, arrested all four occupants, separated them outside
the car, and then searched the interior of the car, finding cocaine in a zippered jacket
pocket in the back seat).
201. Id. at 460 n.3.
202. Id. at 460.
203. Id. at 461.
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searched regardless of whether they are open or closed and re-
gardless of any expectations of privacy either society or the
owner posits in those containers. Nor, held Belton, does it mat-
ter whether the occupants are still inside the vehicle or whether
they could, in fact, have reached its interior. What does matter,
however, is that the expansive Belton rule not be applied to all
arrest scenarios. Justice Stewart made it clear the Court would
continue to use the ad hoc approach outlined in Chadwick in all
cases not involving automobiles.0 4
In addition to defining the spatial scope of a search incident
to arrest, the Court has also considered its temporal scope.
Properly framed, the question is how soon after the arrest must
the search occur to qualify as a contemporaneous incident
thereto? In Illinois v. Lafayette,205 an individual was arrested
for disturbing the peace and was taken to a police station. In the
process of booking Lafayette, the police conducted a warrantless
search of his shoulder bag for the purposes of inventorying his
personal effects. They discovered illegal drugs. In upholding the
officer's actions, Chief Justice Burger noted that an inventory at
the station house is no more than a continuation of the custody
inherent in the arrest status, with an inventory search being
merely one event along the continuum from arrest to incarcera-
tion. Naturally, different factors come into play at different
points along this continuum. But rather than finding that the
governmental interests served by an arrestee's search diminish
as time passes after the arrest, the Court specifically held that
those "interests underlying a station-house search of the arres-
tee's person and possessions may in some circumstances be even
greater than those supporting a search immediately following ar-
rest." 06 For example, once inside the station house, there is, in
204. Id. at 461-62. Note the Court's eminently logical treatment of the automobile
when it collides with a Terry stop and frisk or with a search incident to arrest. When the
officer's predicate actions are measured by a lesser standard - for example, reasonable
suspicion - the narrowness of the permissible scope of the search so reflects; but where
the standard is higher - for example, probable cause - so is the scope broader. Thus,
if the occupant of the car is arrested, then the officer may search the entire passenger
compartment and any containers found therein, whereas if the occupant is only stopped,
then the officer must limit his search to that part of the car from which the suspect
might reasonably gain immediate control of weapons.
205. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
206. Id. at 645.
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addition to the need to remove weapons and prevent the de-
struction of evidence, the need to inventory property found on
an arrestee in order to deter false claims of property loss by the
owner and to inhibit theft of any articles by those employed in
police activities. Lafayette also suggested that certain activities,
such as the disrobing of an arrestee, while unreasonable or em-
barrassingly intrusive on the street, would be, under certain cir-
cumstances, permissible at the station house.2 07 Therefore, since
the officer could have searched the bag at the time of the arrest,
he also a fortiori could have lawfully searched it when booking
the defendant.
When viewed from an analytical perspective, Lafayette is
really little more than a reaffirmation by the Court of the ap-
proach adopted in Chadwick. The shoulder bag was still in the
possession and control of Lafayette. Applying the Chimel test, it
is clear the bag was within the arrestee's immediate grasp and,
hence, could have been searched. Lafayette simply removed any
requirement - imagined or otherwise - that the search occur
at the inception of the arrest, illustrating the Court's view of the
entire arresting procedure as a continuum with different and
competing interests at stake depending on where along that con-
tinuum the search takes place. Once the item in question is re-
duced to the exclusive control of the police, however, then a
search of it may no longer be justified as incident to an arrest. In
sum, it will be noted that the law in this area is refreshingly
lucid: immediately upon arrest and for a reasonable time there-
after, an officer may search the person of an arrestee and the
area which he reasonably believes to be within the arrestee's im-
mediate control, with the provision that the entire passenger
compartment of an automobile and all containers found inside
are presumed to be within the occupant's grabbable area.
C. Sanctions of the Fourth Amendment
Once it has been determined that the fourth amendment
has been both triggered and violated, it remains only to deter-
mine what sanction, if any, will be used, since - the fears of
207. The Court specifically declined to discuss "the circumstances in which a strip
search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate." Id. at 646 n.2.
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many critics notwithstanding - not all violations of the fourth
amendment by the government are punished. The sanction, of
course, is the exclusionary rule and the question thus becomes
whether or not it shall be invoked to exclude the tainted or ille-
gally derived evidence from the courtroom. 0 8
1. Invocation of the Exclusionary Rule
This doctrine requiring courts to supress evidence whenever
it is the product of unlawful governmental conduct has long oc-
cupied its position as the enforcement mechanism of the fourth
amendment. Indeed, soon after the rule's birth in Weeks v.
United States,0 9 the Supreme Court extended its reach in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States210 to include, not only
the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also any evidence di-
rectly or indirectly derived from the primary evidence. Almost
from the outset, however, and perhaps wary that the exclusion-
ary rule's heavy hand would be overworked, the Court began to
carve out exceptions to its usually fatal application. For exam-
ple, while Silverthorne extended the rule to encompass deriva-
tive evidence, it also noted that such information does not auto-
matically become "sacred and inaccessible 11  and specifically
held that in certain circumstances, such as where "knowledge of
[the evidence] is gained from an independent source, 212 the evi-
208. See J.H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940)(" 'Our
way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off
somebody else who broke something else.' "; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("To declare that in the administration of the crimi-
nal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the convictions of a private criminal - would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.");
Olmatead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."); People
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The crimi-
nal is to go free because the constable has blundered.... A room is searched against the
law, and the body of a murdered man is found.... The privacy of the home has been
infringed, and the murderer goes free.").
209. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This was the first Supreme Court case to recognize the
exclusionary rule. The first use of the exclusionary rule was in State v. Sheridan, 121
Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903).
210. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
211. Id. at 392.
212. Id.
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dence may be admissible.
Echoing the same sentiment in Nardone v. United
States,213 the Court announced that evidence would not be ex-
cluded where it is demonstrated that the connection between the
illegally acquired evidence and the official illegality has "become
so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 1 ' Subsequently, in
Wong Sun v. United States215 the Court elaborated on the prin-
ciple that illegally obtained evidence need not always be sup-
pressed. Observing that the prime purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter governmental misconduct by depriving police of
the beneficial products of such misconduct, Wong Sun held that
the crucial question to be asked in such a case is whether the
objected-to evidence resulted from an "exploitation of that ille-
gality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint. '21 6 Where the latter is the case, the
purpose of the rule would not be served by its invocation and,
therefore, should not be called upon. Nor, continued the Burger
Court in United States v. Janis, should the rule be applied
beyond the context of a criminal prosecution without first
weighing the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized
evidence against the likely costs of losing such evidence and the
less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that usually
follows.
Consonant with the fact that the exclusionary rule is merely
a judicially created remedy that courts should call upon only
when necessary (as opposed to a constitutional requirement ap-
plicable in all circumstances 21 8), the basic rule of thumb relied
upon by the courts and which may be gleaned from the rule's
first seventy years is that it is to be used only when the legiti-
mate goal of deterrence of police misconduct would be served by
213. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
214. Id. at 341. This holding has given rise to frequent discussion of an attenuation
exception to the exclusionary rule. Far from being an exception, the language in Nardone
merely underscored the necessity of a causal relationship between the primary illegality
and the discovery of the evidence in order to suppress the evidence.
215. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
216. Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT §5.07, at 221 (1959)).
217. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (a federal civil tax proceeding in which the Court refused
to invoke the exclusionary rule).
218. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
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the exclusion of the tainted evidence. Analytically, the approach
to this rationale comprises two discrete inquiries: first, does the
exclusionary rule apply to the context at hand? And second,
does any judicially accepted exception work to prevent its other-
wise proper application? Over the last several terms, the Su-
preme Court has had five occasions to refine and test both this
rationale and this approach.
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,"1 9 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the question of how to determine whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be applied at a deportation hearing. Two
aliens, Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez, had been ordered
deported by an Immigration Judge after having been summoned
to the deportation hearing following an allegedly unlawful arrest
by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents.22 0 Not-
ing that respondent Lopez had objected only to the fact that he
had been produced at the hearing following the unlawful arrest,
the Court held against Lopez without ever reaching the issue of
whether the arrest was unlawful because "[tlhe 'body' or iden-
tity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceed-
ing is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful
arrest."2
2 1
Respondent Sandoval, however, presented a more substan-
tive claim by objecting to the admission of his post-arrest state-
ment confessing to his illegal entry into this country, evidence
which would have been excluded at a criminal proceeding.222
Never having squarely addressed the question of the precise
reach of the exclusionary rule beyond the context of a criminal
proceeding, the Court turned to the framework set out in United
States v. Janis223 for deciding in what types of proceedings ap-
219. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
220. Id. at 1034-38.
221. Id. at 1039. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (person arrested
without a warrant entitled to timely determination by neutral magistrate of probable
cause for significant pre-trial restraint, but subsequent conviction not vacated on such
grounds); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (jurisdiction to try a person for a crime
not impaired by fact that defendant was forcibly abducted into state).
222. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040-41.
223. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)
(illegally obtained evidence may be used in proper cross-examination for impeachment
purposes); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to collat-
eral review by way of habeas corpus); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
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plication of the rule is appropriate. This framework is built on a
cost-benefit analysis in which the likely social benefits of exclud-
ing unlawfully seized evidence are weighed against the likely
costs. Applied to the facts of Lopez-Mendoza, the Court was
persuaded that the Janis balance weighed against applying the
rule because its sole purpose - deterrence of future unlawful
police conduct - was not served by its invocation. Specifically,
the Court found that the INS's own comprehensive scheme for
deterring fourth amendment violations by its officers - while
far from perfect - was sufficient to obviate the need for the
working of the exclusionary rule by rendering de minimis any
deterrent value its application might have in a non-criminal
hearing. 224
2. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
If, however, the context is a criminal prosecution or, in the
alternative, a non-criminal proceeding in which Lopez-Men-
doza's cost-benefit analysis weighs in favor of applying the ex-
clusionary rule, then the next step is to determine whether any
one of the three judicially accepted exceptions applies. These are
the independent source, inevitable discovery, and good faith ex-
ceptions; the last two are of recent vintage.
a. Independent Source Exception
In Segura v. United States,226 the defendants moved to sup-
press two sets of evidence seized from their apartment during a
warrantless initial entry and a subsequent warrant search. Pur-
suant to an investigation, police arrested defendant Segura in
the lobby of his apartment building, took him to his apartment,
knocked on the door, and entered without permission when the
door was opened by the female defendant Colon. After observing
various drug paraphernalia in plain view inside the apartment,
two officers took the defendants to police headquarters, while
another two remained behind awaiting a search warrant that
had been sent for before the initial entry into the apartment.
(exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury considerations).
224. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044-45.
225. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
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Some nineteen hours later, the warrant was issued and the sub-
sequent search revealed three pounds of cocaine and other
evidence.226
At the outset, the Court noted that the issue before it was
narrow and precise: Assuming the initial warrantless entry was
unlawful and the subsequent search warrant was valid, the
Court considered only whether those items "not observed during
the initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day after
the entry, under an admittedly valid search warrant, should
have been suppressed. 22 7 The Court's answer was equally pre-
cise. Since none of the information on which the warrant was
secured was derived from the illegal entry into the defendant's
apartment, the exclusionary rule's avowed purpose would not be
served by excluding the evidence. Accordingly, and stressing
that the remedial nature of the rule controls its application, the
Court held that the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant
was admissible under the independent source exception as first
laid out in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.28 In sum,
where the prosecution can show that the evidence was derived
from a source independent of the illegal activity, such evidence
will not be excluded.
b. Inevitable Discovery Exception
A second exception, announced by the Supreme Court in
Nix v. Williams' 9 and consistent with the principles underlying
both the independent source doctrine and the good faith excep-
tion, is the inevitable discovery doctrine. Specifically, this excep-
tion is based on the question of causation and whether the police
misconduct was indispensable to the discovery of the evidence.
Where it is not indispensable and some factual nexus between
the evidence and an unrelated, untainted source can be shown,
the evidence will not be excluded. This is grounded on the pro-
position that no purpose is served by excluding evidence that
would have been discovered even without the misconduct.
This doctrine was first hinted at in an oft-cited footnote in
226. Id. at 800-01.
227. Id. at 804.
228. 251 U.S. 385 (1920) cited in Segura. 468 U.S. at 805.
229. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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Brewer v. Williams, 230 where the defendant's murder conviction
was overturned because an investigator had illegally obtained in-
criminating evidence after he had given the defendant the fa-
mous "Christian burial speech."' 31 In reviewing the Nix case
(which was Williams' second journey through the state and fed-
eral criminal justice systems), the Court specifically addressed
the issue of whether evidence pertaining to the discovery and
condition of ten-year-old Pamela Powers' body should have been
admitted - despite the officer's unlawful conduct - on the
ground that it would ultimately or inevitably have been discov-
ered by the 200-member search party even if no violation of any
constitutional provisions had taken place. The answer was
hardly surprising; the rationale bears inspection. In admitting
the evidence, the Court explicitly endorsed the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine by focusing, once again, on the high cost exclusion
imposes on society whenever a criminal goes free "because the
constable has blundered. '232 The Nix Court concluded that such
costs are justified only where it can be shown the rule has some
significant deterrent impact on future police misconduct. "[T]he
prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would
have been in if no illegality had transpired. '233 But neither is it
to be put in a worse position. In short, the prosecution should
stand as if no illegality on the part of the government had ever
occurred. Applied to the facts in Nix, the Court found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence 23 that, even without the incriminat-
ing statements, the body eventually would have been found by
the search party. Such evidence, therefore, ought to have been
admitted.2 35
Nor must the prosecution show that the police acted in good
faith. Such a requirement "would place courts in the position of
withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that
would have been available to police absent any unlawful police
activity. 2 3 6 But this placing of the police in a worse position for
230. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
231. Id. at 399-400 n.6.
232. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
233. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443.
234. Id. at 444.
235. Id. at 448-50.
236. Id. at 445.
[Vol. 6:543
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
the unlawful conduct is precisely the result prohibited in Nix.
Moreover, noted the Court, an officer will rarely, if ever, be in a
position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevita-
bly be discovered and, therefore, could not use the existence of
such an exception to govern his actions.237 When coupled with
the presence of other significant disincentives to obtaining evi-
dence illegally - such as the possibility of departmental and
civil liability - it becomes clear that the likelihood of the inev-
itable discovery exception promoting police misconduct is so
minimal as to render problematic any possible benefits to deter-
rence that a good-faith requirement might produce. As with the
independent source doctrine, the factual question here is simply
whether the evidence would have been discovered absent the po-
lice misconduct. Nix makes it clear that if the answer is yes,
then the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule has so lit-
tle basis that the evidence should be received.
c. Good Faith Exception
The newest of the three exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
commonly referred to as the good faith exception, was first an-
nounced by the Supreme Court on July 5, 1984, in United
States v. Leon2  and Massachusetts v. Sheppard.239 In Leon,
the police conducted a search for drugs and other evidence pur-
suant to a facially valid warrant that an appellate court later
found defective.24 In Sheppard, the police relied upon what was
later determined to be a technically deficient warrant - the af-
fiant had used the wrong form - in conducting their search for
murder evidence.2 41 In both cases, the Supreme Court refused to
exclude the results of the searches, holding that the fourth
237. Id. Query, as did the Nix Court, whether it would matter that the officer does
or does not foresee the inevitable discovery of the sought-for evidence. If he does not,
then the expected result of his transgressions would be suppression of the evidence and
he would consequently refrain from such actions; whereas, if he does foresee its inevita-
ble discovery, then he would certainly refrain from engaging in any dubious shortcuts
which might jeopardize the admissibility of his hard-earned evidence. In either case, the
officer would have nothing to gain by acting unlawfully.
238. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
239. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). Strictly speaking, Leon was the groundbreaker and Shep-
pard was Leon's first application.
240. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902-04.
241. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 984-87.
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amendment's exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to
bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence ob-
tained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search war-
rant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, that is ulti-
mately found to be invalid.
The Court rested this potentially far-reaching decision on a
multi-tiered analysis grounded on three bases. First, the Court
opined, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, and
the object of the deterrence is the policeman, not the judge, be-
cause "there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and mag-
istrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment
or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of
the extreme sanction of exclusion. '2 42 Second, the question as to
whether a magistrate correctly determined the existence of prob-
able cause is an issue for judges and lawyers. As such, it is far
beyond the ken of an ordinary officer, who lacks the requisite
legal training, to second-guess a magistrate's judgment. "[O]nce
the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman
can do in seeking to comply with the law. '2 43 To ignore this sim-
ple reality and penalize an officer who reasonably relies on a
magistrate's error is to defy both logic and the deterrent purpose
of the rule. Finally, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule
cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objec-
tively reasonable law-enforcement activity, such as where an of-
ficer acting with objective good faith supplies the information
upon which a search warrant issues and then acts within its
scope. The Court's conclusion was concise: evidence obtained in
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search war-
rant is admissible.
In so holding, the Court specifically limited the exception so
that it will not apply in the following situations: where the police
conduct is not objectively reasonable (such as where the magis-
trate is given information that the officer "knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of
the truth"244 ); where the magistrate had not been neutral and
242. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
243. Id. at 921 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, C.J.
concurring)).
244. Id. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). "We emphasize that
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detached;2 48 or where there are blatant deficiencies in the war-
rant, to include a total lack of indicia of probable cause or a
failure to particularize the place to be searched or the things to
be seized.24 Notwithstanding these limitations, Justice Bren-
nan's fears, as expressed in his dissent in Leon, 47 that this doc-
trine will soon be applied to warrantless searches may have some
merit. Indeed, much of the language in Leon suggests a broad
good-faith rationale, with objective reliance on a deficient war-
rant emerging as simply one example of this newly born doc-
trine. For example, in stressing the inapplicability of the deter-
rence rationale when official conduct is pursued in complete
good faith, the Leon Court noted that "[t]his is particularly
true, we believe, when an officer acting with objective good faith
has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and
acted within its scope. '248 Given such language and the Court's
ill-disguised disenchantment with the exlusionary rule, it is
likely the Court will soon find other "particularly compelling ex-
ample[s] of good faith" upon which to place its imprimatur.
With regard to the exclusionary rule, the conclusion of the
Supreme Court's decisions of the last several years is that where
officers have acted unlawfully in procuring evidence of crime and
the exclusion of the evidence will well serve to prevent these and
other officers from acting in a similar manner, the evidence will
not be admitted. But where the exclusion of the evidence will
work no deterrent effect (such as where the officers have acted in
objective good faith) or the evidence would have been procured
even absent the misconduct (such as where it was derived from a
source independent of the illegal activity or would inevitably
have been discovered), the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule
would not be furthered and the evidence will be admitted.
the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one." Id. at 919 n.20.
245. Id. at 923 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)).
246. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part)).
247. Id. at 928-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This dissenting opinion applied to both
Leon and Sheppard.
248. Id. at 920 (emphasis added).
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III. Conclusion
Few areas of jurisprudence cut as close to the bone as does
the fourth amendment. Given the unprecedented level of activ-
ity in such a volatile area and the concomitant reordering of
many of the values which underlie society's approach to the
criminal justice system, the great and heated debate which arises
every time the Supreme Court puts pen to paper is hardly sur-
prising. Critics contend that the Burger Court has, in the last
several years, foresaken its role as the protector of individual
liberties and has become just another adjunct to the law-en-
forcement field, while advocates respond to the doomsayers by
noting that the decisions of the Burger Court, exhibiting judicial
restraint, are more in tune, and less at odds, with the Founding
Fathers than ever was the aberrational Warren Court.
Stripped of all this dangerous rhetoric, what may be gleaned
from the Supreme Court's last several terms is its decision that
it is not always just to forego probative and competent evidence
whenever the constable blunders. This Court has con-
cluded - in what is in essence an altogether unremarkable pro-
position - that the issue of the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence must be resolved by recourse to a balancing
process. On the one side is the protection of the sanctity of the
home, the deterrence of police misconduct, and the consequent
promotion of the integrity of the judicial process. On the other
side, in direct and often conflicting juxtaposition, is the undesir-
ability of withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth,
the high social cost of letting the obviously guilty go unpunished
for their crimes, and the resultant denigration of the integrity
and fairness of a criminal trial. Where these scales tip in favor of
exclusion, there the evidence will not be admitted. Conversely,
where the balance is in favor of admission, there the evidence
will not be excluded. It may be concluded, therefore, when the
din raised by these decisions settles and with little chance of
contradiction by those who view the battle, not from the line of
scrimmage or the stands, but from the cooling perspective of the
pressbox, that all is well in fourth amendment land, that this
knight of justice - endowed by its creators with unparallelled
resilience - stands unblemished by the excesses of history. In
short, those who have sought to recast its armor in their own
image have left it untarnished and ready for the jousts to come.
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